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Born in the twentieth century, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is still largely built on the rules 
and dispute settlement mechanisms it adopted at its inception in the last century. However, world 
trade is a rather different beast in the 21st century and will continue to evolve. The WTO must adapt 
to this new world or it will be quickly marginalized. 
The WTO is not keeping pace with the changes taking place in the world. The cross-border flows of 
goods, services, know-how, investment and people participating in international production 
networks – supply-chain trade in economic jargon – have transformed the global economy. The 
WTO is caught between fulfilling its original mission and addressing new and emerging realities. 
It seems mired in malaise. The 20th century conflicts over tariffs and agricultural barriers prevents 
the WTO from concluding the Doha Development Round commenced in November 2001. It seems 
equally incapable of moving forward in other areas. Consequently, the most stalwart WTO members 
are developing trade arrangements independent of existing WTO structures in order to regulate 21st 
century trade. 
This failure is in several respects paradoxical. The malaise does not in itself reflect hostility towards 
the principles of free trade or the liberalization of international commerce. Quite the contrary, WTO 
members, including countries like India, Brazil and China which have long criticized the 
organization, have conducted a massive liberalization of trade, investment and services on their own 
accord since the beginning of the new century. In fact, WTO members have unilaterally, bilaterally 
or regionally advanced the WTO’s liberalization objectives everywhere except within the WTO 
itself. 
Nor is the apparent disillusionment with the WTO a sign that it has lost popularity. The organization 
continues to attract new members, including powerful nations like Russia, despite the political cost 
they must incur to gain a membership card. The WTO may seem less useful now to some members 
but it would be premature to write it off as irrelevant. Indeed, its dispute settlement procedures are 
used by an ever wider range of members. In short, when trade issues characteristic of the 20th 
century have to be addressed, the WTO’s existence is still justified and it remains a viable entity. 
The WTO is afflicted by the emergence of a new type of trade: the unbundling of production or, as it 
is more commonly expressed, the emergence of Global Value Chains (GVCs), which have reshaped 
the geography of global production. Today, joining a supply chain is the fastest route to 
industrialization for emerging markets. Unbundling has also restructured the geography of global 
demand. 
In this new trade configuration, there is no place for protectionism. In fact, countries that establish 
trade barriers are signaling local manufacturers to relocate elsewhere, thus excluding themselves 
from GVCs. In other words, protectionist measures have become for all practical purposes 
destructive measures. 
New forms of trade need new governing rules which go beyond those of the WTO as they stand. 
Since the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations (1995), virtually all the necessary new 
governance required has been formulated spontaneously by developing countries in regional trade 
agreements (RTA) or through unilateral trade policy reforms. The real danger for the WTO, 
therefore, is not so much its complete failure but the erosion of its centrality in the global trading 
system. 
In this context, the WTO’s future will most likely take one of two forms. In the first case, it will 
merely handle matters associated with 20th century trade rules but irrelevant for 21st century trade 
and GVCs. All “new generation” trade issues will be addressed in other formats, most likely in 
RTAs. 
In this rather optimistic scenario, which seems to be the path currently being followed by the WTO, 
the Geneva-based organization will maintain its role as one of the pillars of world trade governance. 
This outcome would be reminiscent of the European Union’s three-pillar structure, in which the first 
pillar (basically, the disciplines agreed in different treaties up to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty) was 
supplemented by two new pillars to cover new areas of cooperation. A pessimistic version of this 
scenario envisions that a lack of progress in adopting new rules may undermine political support for 
the organization and that violations of WTO disciplines may become commonplace. 
Under the second scenario, the emergence of other mechanisms of trade governance will 
reinvigorate the centrality of the WTO, forcing it to then engage in 21st century trade issues both by 
developing new multilateral disciplines – or at least general guidelines – on issues such as 
investment guarantees, and by providing a multilateral dimension to some of the new disciplines 
which have emerged in RTAs. 
This future outlook could take different forms. The WTO’s engagement may involve varying levels 
of plurilateralism where only a group of members sign up to new disciplines rather than the latter 
being binding on all WTO members. Several examples, such as the Information Technology 
Agreement (ATI) and the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), embody this approach. 
Another variant is an expansion of the Doha Round agenda which would include some of the new 
trade issues which are now matters for RTAs. 
Naturally, 20th century type of trade has not disappeared, but if it remains important in certain 
goods (e.g. primary products) and for some countries (Global Supply Chains are still rare in Latin 
America and Africa), the most dynamic aspect of trade in the 21st century is the development of 
GVCs. For this reason, the formulation of new rules and disciplines regulating trade, services, 
intellectual property, investment and business mobility is being increasingly undertaken outside the 
structures of the WTO, which were not designed to regulate these issues. 
Developing countries seek to quickly and unilaterally lower their tariffs (especially on intermediate 
goods) and unilaterally remove barriers and other “behind the border” (non-tariff barriers) obstacles 
to the expansion of trade, investment and services and intellectual property rights protection. 
Moreover, both developed and developing countries are eager to sign bilateral investment 
agreements and comprehensive RTAs which clearly stipulate the 21st century disciplines. 
These developments have dramatically eroded the WTO’s bearing in the global trade governance 
system. The implication for states’ trade policies is obvious. WTO members will now have to decide 
whether the international trade organization continue to regulate global trade with a 20th century 
mindset or it works constructively and creatively to delineate a new range of rules and disciplines to 
address the realities of 21st Century trade. 
 
